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ABSTRACT 
This iBrief will present a hypothetical network that allows 
dissidents to transfer information outside the watchful eye of an 
oppressive government.  It will argue that because a network 
operator meets the requirements of the safe harbor of section 
512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the hosts of the 
network are immune from any vicarious copyright liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Suppose you believe in supporting nascent democracies.  While 
trawling the web, you come across a software client, promoted as a way 
to help dissidents in oppressed regimes.  All you have to do is download 
the client and let your computer help the movement.  Would you 
participate? 
¶2 Consider a network designed to support democracy activists.  To 
conceal the activists’ identities and plans, software developers design the 
network to prevent any user from knowing where data has come from, 
where it is going, and what the data represents.  Indeed, the network 
would allow activists of all stripes to trade documents outside the 
snooping power of oppressive governments.  Individual users—like 
you—are only asked to provide some hard drive space and an Internet 
connection.  The network transfers data through several different users, 
providing more secrecy and reliability.  You, however, will not know 
from whom the data comes, or the content stored on your computer.  
¶3 This secrecy may encourage illegal file sharers to use your 
computer indirectly to transfer illegal files.  Are you liable for their 
illegal activities?  Should you be liable?  This iBrief will argue that, 
because of the way this network has been constructed, the language of 
section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) allows 
people like you to use a safe harbor from copyright infringement.  
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¶4 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 updated the 
Copyright Act to reflect a digital world.2  Congress hoped to provide 
“greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for 
infringement that may occur in the course of their activities.”3  This 
iBrief will explore the applicability of safe harbors codified in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 to a hypothetical network.  By designing a network to allow free 
transfer of data, such a network would also provide a way for users to 
distribute data that may infringe copyright.  As this note will argue, 
entities storing potentially infringing material may moor in the safe 
harbor of section 512(c) of the DMCA.  
¶5 First, the note will discuss the components of section 512.  
Second, it will describe a hypothetical network.  Third, it will apply 
section 512(c) to the hypothetical network.  Finally, the note will 
consider the legality of the network in light of other bodies of law.  
I. THE SECTION 512 SAFE HARBORS 
¶6 The DMCA provides a safe harbor from liability for copyright 
infringement for four types of services that an entity may provide its 
users: transitory digital network communications,4 system caching,5 
information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users,6 
and information location tools.7   
¶7 Section 512(a) applies to large Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs).8  Congress intended that this section provide a safe harbor to 
companies like Verizon and AT&T.9  The statute allows service 
providers that transmit, route, or provide connections to disclaim liability 
from secondary copyright infringement.10  As a part of a connection 
between users, potentially infringing material may be copied as data is 
transferred.11  For this safe harbor to apply, any copies made must be of a 
                                                            
2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
3 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998) [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
4 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2007). 
5 § 512(b). 
6 § 512(c). 
7 § 512(d). 
8 See § 512(a). 
9 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“Section (a) applies to communications 
functions associated with sending digital communications of others across 
digital networks, such as the Internet and other online networks.”). 
10 § 512(a). 
11 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“Section (a) applies to service providers 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for material, and some forms of 
 
 
transient nature.12  Without section 512(a), the Internet would not likely 
exist as it does today.  
¶8 Section 512(b) protects companies that cache data while 
providing connections to customers.13  Caching speeds up access to 
content accessed by more than one user.14  It requires copying the data 
returned by a user’s request for data from a remote server.15  While 
caching, the service provider may infringe copyright because the service 
provider reproduces copyrighted material.  This copy, however, simply 
allows the local server to provide data to a subsequent user without 
transferring duplicate data over the Internet.  Section 512(b) codifies the 
legality of this practice, which increases the efficiency of the Internet. 
¶9 The third provision, section 512(c), protects companies from 
liability arising from material posted by a user.16  Specifically, the 
DMCA provides a safe harbor from most monetary and injunctive relief 
when a service provider would otherwise be liable for an “infringement 
of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material 
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider.”17  Auction18 and shopping19 websites have safely 
moored in this safe harbor.  An operator of the hypothetical network 
developed in this iBrief will attempt to use the safe harbor provided for 
“storage at the direction of a user.” 
¶10 Finally, section 512(d) protects companies that index, refer to, 
and link to websites that infringe copyright.20  Search engines commonly 
index content without verifying the legality of linked content.  When 
                                                                                                                                     
intermediate and transient storage of material in the course of performing these 
functions.”). 
12 Id. 
13 § 512(b). 
14 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“In terminology describing current 
technology, this storage is a form of "caching," which is used on some networks 
to increase network performance and to reduce network congestion generally, as 
well as to reduce congestion and delays to popular sites.”). 
15See id. at 42 (“The material in question is stored on the service provider's 
system or network for some period of time to facilitate access by users 
subsequent to the one who previously sought access to it.”). 
16 Id. at 43 (“Examples of such storage [applicable in section (c)] include 
providing server space for a user's web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in 
which material may be posted at the direction of users.”). 
17 § 512(c). 
18 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
19 See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004).  
20 § 512(d). 
 
 
enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized the importance of indexing 
the Internet through search engines.21   
¶11 This iBrief will focus on the applicability of section 512(c) to a 
hypothetical network.  Section 512(c) allows a service provider to 
disclaim liability from copyright infringement arising from information 
stored on its systems at the direction of a user.22  Before discussing 
section 512(c) and its related provisions in detail, the iBrief will present 
the hypothetical network.   
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL NETWORK 
¶12 This iBrief will first discuss the components of the network and 
then discuss the connection between components.  There are several 
components to the hypothetical network.  This iBrief will assume an 
initial user, three intermediate users, and a final user exist.  The initial 
user (U0) transfers a file to intermediate users, who store the files and 
consequently transfer the file to the final user (UF).  Each user that 
connects to an intermediate user for the first time must agree to policies 
mandated by the intermediate user. 
¶13 The network extends normal peer-to-peer file sharing 
technology.  Additionally, the hypothetical network uses two programs 
to maintain the secrecy of the identity and content of the files.  The first 
program encrypts the file so it is not easily comprehensible without 
decryption using an encryption key.  The second program, using an 
encoding key, the size of the original file, and the original filename, 
splits the encrypted file into pieces and generates filenames for each 
piece.  UF uses these programs in reverse order to recreate the original 
file.  UF and U0 pass the two keys (encryption and encoding) off-
network.  Put another way, UF and U0 transfer the keys over another 
network, such as by telephone.  Therefore, only U0 and UF can combine 
and decrypt the file pieces to recreate the original file.  Modern 
cryptography techniques can be applied to a real network based on this 
hypothetical network.  For example, a public/private key system could be 
used in this network.   
¶14 In the hypothetical network, before U0 uploads a file to the 
service providers, U0 runs the two programs.  Once U0 has encrypted 
and split the original file, U0 broadcasts a request for storage to the 
                                                            
21 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 49 (“This provision is intended to promote the 
development of information location tools generally, and Internet directories 
such as Yahoo!'s in particular, by establishing a safe-harbor from copyright 
infringement liability for information location tool providers if they comply with 
the notice and takedown procedures and other requirements of section (d).”). 
22 § 512(c). 
 
 
intermediate users.  Any intermediate user that will accept storage 
responds affirmatively.  U0 transfers each file piece to a different 
intermediate user.  When UF wants to find a file, UF enters the original 
file size, encoding key and original filename into the second application 
to generate the names of the files that constitute the original file.  UF 
then searches for the file pieces on the network following standard peer-
to-peer network techniques.  Once UF downloads all of the file pieces, 
UF can recreate the original file with the encryption key and first 
program. 
¶15 The hypothetical network explained above intentionally abstracts 
the network for clarity.  Moreover, although it may seem complex, this 
hypothetical network could be implemented rather easily with software.23  
This iBrief will not discuss the liability of U0 and UF or the software 
developer.  First, if U0 and UF infringe copyright, the safe harbors of 
section 512 are inapposite to their liability.  Moreover, illegal file sharers 
are not the intended users of the network.  Second, potential liability for 
software developers involves unresolved legal questions beyond the 
purview of this iBrief.  The iBrief will argue that the intermediate users 
that host files may disclaim liability for copyright infringement under 
section 512(c) of the DMCA.   
III. DISSECTING SECTION 512(C) OF THE DMCA  
¶16 An entity must pass through several locks before mooring in the 
safe harbor provided by section 512.  Section 512(c) provides that: 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except 
as provided in section (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction 
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled 
or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider— 
(A) 
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; 
                                                            
23 An existing network that would likely fit within this hypothetical network is 
Freenet. See The Freenet Project, http://freenetproject.org (last visited Oct. 31, 
2009).  
 
 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in 
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject 
of infringing activity.24 
¶17 To apply this statute to the hypothetical network, this iBrief will 
first discuss the threshold requirements for entities wishing to utilize the 
safe harbors of section 512.  It will then discuss the statutory 
requirements of section 512(c).  For each requirement, this iBrief will 
discuss the current state of the law and then apply the law to the network 
as described.  
A. The Definition of a Service Provider 
¶18 Section 512(k)(1)(B) defines service provider as: “a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”25  
Some plaintiffs have argued that entities must provide data connections, 
like an internet service provider, to qualify for service provider status.26  
Courts, however, have construed the definition of service provider 
broadly, including websites in the definition.27  Although courts have 
interpreted the definition of service provider broadly to include many 
types of services, courts have not determined if an entity must meet a 
minimum size requirement to qualify as a service provider.  
¶19 Courts have allowed many entities to claim service provider 
status.  In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Western District of 
Washington held that Amazon was a service provider when it provided 
website space to third party sellers.28  Corbis alleged that several of 
Amazon’s third party sellers infringed copyrights held by Corbis.29  The 
                                                            
24 § 512(c). 
25 § 512(k)(1)(B). 
26 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 n.6 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004) (“Corbis argues that Amazon is not a service provider because 
Amazon does not serve to route or connect online digital communications.’ This 
argument is unavailing.  The relevant definition of service provider does not 
require Amazon to engage in such activity.”  (citations omitted)). 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 1100 (“Amazon operates web sites, provides retail and third party 
selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to govern access to 
its web sites.  These activities fall squarely within the broad scope of the § 
512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service provider’.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
29 Id. at 1097 (“Corbis has identified a total of 232 images . . . in which it claims 
a copyright interest.  Two of the images appeared on the IMDb website.  The 
 
 
court wrote that Amazon’s selling and serving customers falls “squarely 
within the broad scope of the § 512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service 
provider’ . . . .”30  Extending to providers beyond the World Wide Web, 
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation held that: “[a]lthough the Act was not 
passed with Napster-type services in mind, the definition of Internet 
service provider is broad, . . . and, . . . Aimster [a Napster type service] 
fits it.”31  Although the In re Aimster court rejected Aimster’s attempt to 
pursue the safe harbor of section 512, the court concluded that 
distribution networks were considered service providers under section 
512(k)(1)(B).32  Since the courts have interpreted this provision broadly, 
an internet storage provider should fall within the definition of service 
provider of section 512(c). 
¶20 Although the case law allows many services to qualify as service 
providers, the case law does not clearly state what size entities must be to 
qualify as service providers.  Large companies like Amazon33 and 
eBay34 have easily passed the bar as service providers.  In ALS Scan, Inc. 
v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.,35 a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit 
held that even smaller entities were service providers.36  Remarq was, in 
Internet terms, a small provider.  At the time of litigation, it provided 
access to 24,000 subscribers,37 and “remove[d] [user-posted materials] 
after about 8–10 days to accommodate its limited server capacity.”38  
Both parties conceded that size did not disqualify Remarq from service 
provider status.39  Size has not been litigated as a matter of practicality: 
since section 512(c) requires that service providers lack knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                     
remaining 230 images have been copied, displayed, and sold by vendor 
defendants through their zShops sites.”). 
30 Id. at 1100. 
31 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
32 Id. (“Aimster fits [the definition of a section 512 service provider].”). 
33 Corbis, 351 F.Supp. 2d at 1100 (“Amazon operates web sites, provides retail 
and third party selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to 
govern access to its web sites.  These activities fall squarely within the broad 
scope of the § 512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service provider’.”  (footnotes 
omitted)). 
34 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(“There is no dispute over whether eBay is an Internet ‘service provider’ within 
the meaning of Section 512.”). 
35 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001). 
36Id. at 623 (“Neither party to this case suggests that RemarQ is not an Internet 
service provider for purposes of the Act.”). 
37 Id. at 620 (“[RemarQ] has approximately 24,000 subscribers.”). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 623. 
 
 
infringement,40 most small service providers would be denied the safe 
harbor because they would be aware of the legality or illegality of 
activity occurring on their networks.  This iBrief asserts that a single user 
qualifies as a service provider as defined by section 512(k)(1)(B).  This 
assertion is based on the broad language in section 512.  In further 
defining service provider, the section states that a service provider is an 
entity that provides “online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing.”41  The legislative 
history neither promotes nor prohibits this characterization; the Senate 
Report simply states that the category is intentionally broad.42 
¶21 In the hypothetical network, the intermediate users can properly 
claim service provider status under the definition of a service provider in 
section 512(k)(1)(B).  The intermediate users provide “online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of 
material of the user’s choosing . . . .”43  The intermediate users provide 
online communications between U0 and UF.  U0 chooses the material.  
Therefore, the intermediate users pass the first hurdle in claiming 
protection from liability for the information that they store.  For the 
remainder of the iBrief, the intermediate users will be called service 
providers.  
B. A Termination Policy  
¶22 Section 512(i)(1)(A) requires that a service provider “has 
adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy 
that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or 
network who are repeat infringers.”44  The Senate Report stated that 
Congress wanted users who “abuse their access to the Internet through 
disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others [to] know that 
there is a realistic threat of losing that access.”45  A user termination 
policy fits this requirement.  There are two independent requirements: 
adoption of a policy and its reasonable implementation.   
                                                            
40 See infra Part III.E.  
41 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2007). 
42 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 54–55 (1998) (stating that the service provider 
definition for section (b)–(d) is broader than that for section (a), but not giving a 
better explanation of the definition). 
43 § 512(k)(1)(A). 
44 § 512(i)(1)(A). 
45 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 52. 
 
 
¶23 First, section 512(i)(1)(A) requires that service providers inform 
users of the consequences of using a network for copyright 
infringement.46  The language of the statute, however, allows the 
provider latitude in designing the policy.47  In Corbis, Amazon required 
that sellers agree to a user termination policy before selling on 
Amazon.48  Although Amazon’s policy did not “precisely track the 
language of the DMCA,” the court held that the policy was properly 
constructed.49  The Western District of Washington noted that the policy 
prohibited the “listing, linking, or posting of any material that violates 
copyright laws,” and warned infringers that Amazon may penalize users 
by “restricting access to Amazon’s sites and suspen[ding] or terminat[ing 
users’] service.”50  A policy that states the crime and potential liability 
should pass muster under the DMCA.  Furthermore, the statute does not 
require that service providers demonstrate user policy enforcement.51  
Therefore, even if the provider has not actually terminated users, the 
provider should be protected by the safe harbor if it has a policy 
consistent with the requirements of section 512.52 
¶24  Reasonable implementation of a user policy “permits service 
providers to implement a variety of procedures, but an implementation is 
reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider 
terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”53  The 
service provider legally cannot actively promote infringement;54 a policy 
                                                            
46 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Section 
512(i)(1)(A) requires service providers to . . . inform its subscribers of the 
policy.”). 
47 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (“This open-ended language contrasts markedly with the specific 
requirements for infringement notices and take-down procedures set forth in § 
512(c).”). 
48 Id. (“Each vendor must agree to the terms of the Participation Agreement 
before selling on the [Amazon website].”). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Todd E. Reese, Comment, Wading through the Muddy Waters: The Courts’ 
Misapplication of Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 34 
SW. U. L. REV. 287, 298 (2004) (“Nowhere does the statute say that the policy 
must have been applied to a specific individual. Thus, an [online service 
provider] must simply make a good faith effort at consistently applying its 
policy.”). 
52 See id. (noting that a policy does not necessarily need to be enforced to 
qualify under the safe harbor). 
53 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). 
54 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(determining that active promotion of infringement does not allow a company to 
 
 
to prohibit infringement must be combined with actual termination of 
users.55  In CCBill, the Ninth Circuit held that “a service provider 
‘implements’ a policy if it has a working notification system, a procedure 
for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not 
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to 
issue such notifications.”56  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that section 
512(c) does not require that a service provider monitor the material or 
activity on its network.57  In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Corbis 
noted “Amazon’s infringement policy has not been able to prevent 
certain vendors from reappearing on the zShops platform under 
pseudonyms.”58  Corbis then asserted “that Posternow’s reappearance 
shows that the infringement policy is a failure.”59  Disagreeing, the court 
held that the DMCA does not require impeccable implementation of the 
user policy: “The mere fact that [a user] appeared on [the service] under 
a different user name and identity does not, by itself, create a legitimate 
question of fact regarding the procedural implementation of Amazon’s 
termination policy.”60  Similarly, in Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, 
Inc., the Northern District of California suggested that a website 
consisting of user-posted videos had reasonably implemented their user 
policy.61  In Io Group, the plaintiff argued that Veoh’s policy was not 
reasonably implemented because it was easy to obtain an email address, 
and an email address was all that was required to subscribe to the 
service.62  The court rejected this argument and held for the defendant.63  
These holdings demonstrate that the safe harbor in section 512(c) is not 
predicated on a proactive search for infringing material. 
                                                                                                                                     
use the safe harbor, the court wrote that “[f]ar from doing anything to discourage 
repeat infringers of the plaintiffs’ copyrights, Aimster invited them to do so . . . 
.”). 
55 See id. (“The common element of its safe harbors is that the service provider 
must do what it can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of its service by 
‘repeat infringers.’”). 
56 488 F.3d at 1109.  
57 See id. at 1111 (“To identify and terminate repeat infringers, a service 
provider need not affirmatively police its users for evidence of repeat 
infringement.”). 
58 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 1104. 
61 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
62 Id. at 1143–44. 
63 Id. at 1144 (holding that simply because the plaintiff was able to make two 
suspiciously named email accounts and sign up independently under each does 
not amount  to lack of a repeat infringer policy). 
 
 
¶25 A service provider must have a policy, inform its users of the 
policy, and reasonably implement the policy.64  In the hypothetical 
network, each service provider has a policy and informs users of the 
policy during a user’s first connection.65  If constructed properly, the 
agreement will satisfy the user policy requirement.  Since a provider 
must know that a user is infringing copyright to implement the user 
policy, reasonable implementation will not be required until the service 
provider obtains knowledge of infringement.  Each service provider has 
no idea whatsoever what data it is holding for the network.66  Moreover, 
a service provider will never receive an infringement notice and therefore 
never become aware of infringement. 67   Service providers comply with 
section 512(i)(1)(A) as long as its user policy describes consequences for 
copyright infringement, the service provider informs users of the policy, 
and, in the unlikely event that the service provider receives repeat 
notifications of infringement, the service provider terminates the user.  
Since the hypothetical network satisfies all of these criteria, the service 
providers should qualify for the section 512(c) safe harbor.  
C. Accommodation of Standard Technical Measures  
¶26 Section 512(i)(1) of the DMCA requires that providers 
accommodate standard technical measures: “The limitations on liability 
established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the 
service provider . . . accommodates and does not interfere with standard 
technical measures.”68  Section 512(i) then defines “standard technical 
measures.”  
[T]echnical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify 
or protect copyrighted works and— 
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of 
copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, 
multi-industry standards process; 
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms; and 
                                                            
64 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Section 
512(i)(1)(A) requires service providers to: (1) adopt a policy that provides for 
the termination of service access for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate 
circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform 
its subscribers of the policy.”). 
65 See supra Part II. 
66 See supra Part II. 
67 See infra Part III.H  
68 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2007). 
 
 
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or 
substantial burdens on their systems or networks.69 
¶27 Rarely do plaintiffs allege that service providers interfere with 
standard technical measures.70  Even when presented with a question of 
what constituted standard technical measures, the Ninth Circuit was 
“unable to determine . . . whether accessing websites is a standard 
technical measure.”71  The Central District of California has held that 
“[i]t thus appears to be an open question if any conduct or policy could 
interfere with ‘standard technical measures.’”72  In Corbis, using a 
website was the way in which rights holders found infringing material.73  
If there is no cognizable standard technical measure, no court could hold 
that a service provider violated this requirement for safe harbor.   
¶28 In the hypothetical network, the system design may frustrate 
attempts to access the material.  The service providers do not frustrate 
access—the programs used before placing files on the network frustrate 
access.  Since there does not seem to be a cognizable “standard technical 
measure” and the service providers do nothing to interfere with a rights 
holder’s ability to search for infringing content on the network, the 
service providers in the hypothetical network comply with section 512(i). 
D. Storage at the Direction of the User 
¶29 The safe harbor in section 512(c) shields service providers from 
liability arising from infringing material stored at the direction of the 
user.74  In some cases, courts and parties have simply assumed that 
                                                            
69 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). 
70 See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (“Nor does [Io] dispute that Veoh . . . accommodates, and does not 
interfere with, ‘standard technical measures’ used to protect copyrighted 
works.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004) (“Corbis has not challenged Amazon’s assertion that it 
accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures used to 
identify and protect copyrighted works.”). 
71 Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). 
72 Perfect 10 Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174 n.18 
(C.D. Cal. 2002). 
73 See 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (“Corbis has identified a total of 232 images . . . 
in which it claims a copyright interest.  Two of the images appeared on the 
IMDb website.  The remaining 230 images have been copied, displayed, and 
sold by vendor defendants through their zShops sites.” (emphasis added)). 
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2007). 
 
 
storage was at the direction of the user.75  In ALS Scan, ALS Scan 
alleged that the defendant was liable for infringing material posted in 
newsgroups by users.76  The court did not even discuss the possibility 
that the infringing materials were not at the direction of the user.77  In Io 
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., the court determined that even 
material created by a process initiated by a user upload is still considered 
at the direction of a user.78  Veoh converted an uploaded file during the 
upload process.79  The Northern District of California determined that 
even when an automated process gives rise to new infringing material, a 
service provider could still retain the safe harbor of section 512(c).80  In 
addition to exempting service providers from liability arising out of 
potentially infringing material, Congress also wanted to protect service 
providers from acts that occurred automatically when a user transferred 
material to a service provider.81  In CoStar Group v. Loopnet,82 the 
District of Maryland held that a real estate listing site stored data at the 
direction of the user.83  Loopnet allowed users to upload photos of real 
estate to a central server.84  The service employed humans to scan photos 
for obvious acts of copyright infringement and other criteria.85  The court 
                                                            
75 See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 
2001) (ruling on a request for safe harbor under DMCA Section 512(c), the 
court never discussed whether the storage was at the direction of the user). 
76 See id. at 620 (“Two of the newsgroups to which RemarQ provides its 
subscribers access contain ALS Scan's name in the titles.  These newsgroups-
‘alt.als’ and ‘alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.als’-contain hundreds of postings that 
infringe ALS Scan's copyrights.  These postings are placed in these newsgroups 
by RemarQ's subscribers.”). 
77 See id. at 623. 
78 See 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]his court finds that 
Veoh does not lose safe harbor through the automated creation of these files.”). 
79 See id.  at 1147 (“[U]sing third-party software, its system creates the Flash 
and still-image files from user-submitted content.”). 
80 See id. at 1148 (“But Veoh does not itself actively participate or supervise the 
uploading of files.  Nor does it preview or select the files before the upload is 
completed.  Instead, video files are uploaded through an automated process 
which is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users.”). 
81 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998) (“[L]iability is ruled out for 
passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by 
another.”) [hereinafter House Report].  
82 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001). 
83 Id. at 702 (“[Pictures] are uploaded at the volition of the user.”). 
84 Id. at 692 (“[A] user, usually a real estate broker, may post a listing of 
commercial real estate available for lease [and can] include a photograph.”). 
85 Id. (“[Photos are] reviewed by a LoopNet employee to determine that it is in 
fact a photograph of commercial property and that there is no obvious indication 
 
 
held that even though humans filtered data, users directed material to be 
stored with the service provider.86  The court in CoStar further noted that 
“[t]he ability to remove or block access to materials cannot mean that 
those materials are not stored at the user's discretion or it would render 
the DMCA internally illogical.”87  Networks that rely on technology to 
filter or do not filter user-posted material certainly fit the standard of 
section 512(c) for materials posted at the direction of the user.  Due to 
the broad language of section 512(c), a service provider that only 
provides storage for user material certainly stores material at the 
direction of the user.  
¶30 A service provider will be able to call upon the section 512(c) 
safe harbor if it provides storage to a user and stores material at the 
direction of the user.  Service providers in the hypothetical network 
provide storage for U0 at U0’s discretion and do nothing except transfer 
the files to UF.  The service provider does not screen data transferred to 
it, nor does it convert the data that U0 transfers to the service provider.  
Since the service providers in the hypothetical network store data at the 
direction of users, the service providers may benefit from the safe harbor 
of section 512(c).   
E. Knowledge 
¶31 To use the safe harbor, section 512(c) also requires that service 
providers lack knowledge of infringement.  In the statute, there are three 
knowledge provisions: 
A service provider shall not be liable for … infringement of 
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of 
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated 
by or for the service provider, if the service provider— 
(A)  
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing;  
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or  
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.88 
                                                                                                                                     
that the photograph was submitted in violation of LoopNet's terms and 
conditions.”). 
86 Id. at 702 (“Although humans are involved rather than mere technology, they 
serve only as a gateway and are not involved in a selection process.”). 
87 Id. 
88 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2007). 
 
 
¶32 The first and second provisions concern what the provider knows 
prior to an infringement suit.  Section (iii) relates to the notification 
provided to a service provider by a rights holder.89  Therefore, this 
portion of the iBrief will discuss section (i), section (ii), and will discuss 
section (iii) in light of the later discussion of notification. 
1. Section (i) 
¶33 Section (i) requires that, before invoking the safe harbor of 
section 512(c), a service provider lacked actual knowledge of 
infringement prior to the lawsuit.90  Courts have set a high bar for actual 
knowledge and most providers simply have no idea when actual acts of 
infringement occur.  In Costar, the plaintiff did not allege the service 
provider had actual knowledge even though humans scanned user-posted 
data for the service provider.91  Even after notices of infringement were 
delivered to the defendant, the court did not impute actual knowledge to 
the defendant.  In CoStar, defendant Loopnet’s use of humans to filter 
material did not give rise to actual knowledge of infringement because 
“CoStar does not attach a copyright notice to its photos and even 
CoStar's own expert could not identify a CoStar photo simply by 
reviewing it.”92  The court held that unless the infringement was blatant, 
Loopnet would not obtain actual knowledge.93  Since few service 
providers have actual knowledge, few cases discuss section (i).  Most 
cases discuss the second section of the knowledge requirement in section 
512(c). 
2. Section (ii) 
¶34 Section (ii) requires that, in order to use the safe harbor, in 
addition to not having actual knowledge, service providers must not be 
aware of “facts or circumstances” that indicate infringement.94  The 
DMCA distinguishes section (ii) from cases in the physical realm that 
have imputed copyright infringement liability to auction houses under 
theories of secondary liability.95  The House Report on the DMCA stated 
that “[t]his standard differs from existing law, under which a defendant 
                                                            
89 See infra Part III.H. 
90 § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
91 CoStar, 164 F. Supp.2d at 698 (“Given the nature of the infringements in this 
case, it was impossible for LoopNet to have knowledge of the alleged 
infringement before receiving notice from CoStar.”). 
92 Id. at 702 (explaining that although cursory, the service provider did have a 
human review uploaded content). 
93 Id. at 698 (“LoopNet cannot be charged with any form of knowledge before 
receiving claims of infringement from CoStar.”). 
94 § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
95 House Report, supra note 83, at 25 (1998). 
 
 
may be liable for secondary infringement if it knows or should have 
known that material was infringing.”96  In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc.,97 the Ninth Circuit held an auction house liable for 
copyright infringement on a theory of secondary liability under legal 
principles common prior to the DMCA.98  The court reasoned that 
Cherry Auction was a proper target for secondary liability because 
Cherry Auction had the right to terminate users for any reason and those 
users sold infringing goods.99  Similarly, eBay users transact business in 
goods that may infringe copyright.100  In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 
however, the Central District of California held that postings on eBay do 
not give eBay knowledge of “facts or circumstances” that indicated 
infringement.101  In contrast to Cherry Auction, the court held “that prior 
to [the] lawsuit, [eBay] did not have actual or constructive knowledge 
that particular listings were being used by particular sellers to sell pirated 
[videos].”102  Therefore, the court allowed eBay to use the safe harbor of 
section 512(c).103   
¶35 Congress intended that section (ii) work like a “red flag” test.104  
“The ‘red flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element.”105  
The subjective element asks what information the provider actually 
had.106  The objective element then queries whether a reasonable person 
would have understood that information to point to infringement.107  In 
                                                            
96 Id. 
97 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
98 Id. at 263 (“Cherry Action’s ability to police it vendors under Cherry 
Auction’s . . . broad contract with its vendors — was sufficient to satisfy the 
control requirement.”). 
99 Id. 
100 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(noting that sellers post advertisements). 
101 Id. at 1088 (“Here, because the focus of the copyright claims against eBay 
concern infringing activity — the sale and distribution of pirated copies of 
“Manson”-using “materials” posted on eBay’s website, Section 512(c) would 
provide eBay a safe harbor from liability if eBay meets the conditions set forth 
therein.”). 
102 Id. at 1093. 
103 Id. at 1088. 
104 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 44 (“Section (c)(1)(A)(ii) can best be 
described as a ‘red flag’ test.”). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. ( “In determining whether the service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’ 
the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in 
question must be determined.”). 
107 Id. (“[I]n deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a "red 
flag"-in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a 
 
 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,108 the Ninth Circuit held that 
Napster had knowledge of infringement occurring on its network.109  
Although Napster was decided under the broader secondary liability 
standard, the decision may factor into requests for the DMCA safe 
harbor.  Napster’s network likely would have met this “red flag” test.  
Looking through the lens of the “red flag” test, Napster had a list of the 
files transferred on its network, including many copyrighted popular 
music songs.110  Napster therefore had information that indicated 
infringement (the subjective test) and the court held that a reasonable 
person probably would have understood that this information pointed to 
infringement (the objective test).  In contrast with the standard 
articulated in Napster, however, the Senate Report on the DMCA stated 
that a, “service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright 
infringement.”111  Although a service provider must acknowledge the 
“red flags” of infringement, the safe harbor of section 512(c) does not 
require that a service provider affirmatively search its network for 
potentially infringing material.  Additionally, a service provider “would 
not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of 
obvious infringement.”112  In other words, the provider cannot be 
willfully blind of infringement.  
3. Section (iii) 
¶36 Section (iii) requires that once a service provider obtains 
knowledge of the infringement, the provider “expeditiously” remove 
infringing material.113  This section imparts knowledge to a service 
provider after notification of infringement is presented to a service 
provider.114  Therefore, only when a service provider receives a 
notification does section (iii) apply to the right to safe harbor under 
section 512(c).  Part III. H. of this iBrief, below, discusses notification. 
                                                                                                                                     
reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances-an 
objective standard should be used.”). 
108239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)  
109Id. at 1021 (“Regardless of the number of Napster's infringing versus 
noninfringing uses, the evidentiary record here supported the district court’s 
finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or 
had reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiff’s copyrights.”). 
110 Id. at 1012 (“Once uploaded to the Napster servers, the user’s MP3 file 
names are stored in a server-side “library” under the user’s name and become 
part of a ‘collective directory’ of files available for transfer during the time the 
user is logged onto the Napster system.”). 
111 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 48 (1998). 
112 Id. 
113 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2009). 
114 See infra Part III.H. 
 
 
4. Application 
¶37 The service providers of the hypothetical network lack either 
actual knowledge or “facts or circumstances” that imply infringement.  
Without significant effort and the entire file, it would be impossible for 
the service providers to know the name of the file, let alone its contents.  
Therefore, unlike in Napster,115 the service provider cannot simply 
search its indices to determine whether there is infringing content, even if 
that doctrine were applied in DMCA cases.  Service providers cannot 
even search for files by original filename.  Since the service providers do 
not know what files are being transferred, no red flags are presented to 
the service provider.  In a sense, the service providers of the hypothetical 
network may be turning a blind eye to what data users transfer because 
they are unable to see what information is being stored.  Service 
providers, however, must lack knowledge of the contents of network 
files, lest that information find its way into adverse hands.  Therefore, the 
service providers should be able to moor in the safe harbor of section 
512(c). 
F. Right and Ability to Control 
¶38 Section 512(c) also discusses a service provider’s “right and 
ability to control [infringing] activity.”116  The right and ability to control 
activity is a necessary part of a rights holder’s attempt to deny a service 
provider access to the safe harbor if the service provider gains a direct 
financial benefit from the activity.117  There is a tension between this 
provision and the lack of knowledge requirement outlined in section 
512(c)(1)(A).118  For example, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster had 
the right and ability to control its users because “Napster has an express 
reservation of rights policy, stating on its website that it expressly 
reserves the ‘right to refuse service and terminate accounts.’”119  This 
interpretation of “right and ability to control,” however, was not 
premised on section 512(c), but under the more expansive general 
secondary infringement standard.120  Considering this tension, the 
                                                            
115 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its 
search indices. . . .”). 
116 § 512(c)(1)(B). 
117 Id.; see also supra Part III.E. 
118 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004) (discussing how other courts have held the ability to terminate 
accounts is not tantamount to the right and ability to control). 
119 A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1023 (agreeing with the lower court that since 
Napster policed its service, it had the right and ability to control users). 
120 Id. at 1024 (“Napster’s failure to police the system’s ‘premises’ . . . leads to 
the imposition of vicarious liability.”). 
 
 
Central District of California has held that it would be impossible to 
satisfy both the termination procedure of section 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 
lack a right and ability to terminate accounts.121  The court went on to 
note that “Congress could not have intended for courts to hold that a 
service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the 
DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the 
DMCA.”122  A service provider with a termination policy that satisfies 
section 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not necessarily mean that the service 
provider has the right and ability to control users. 
¶39 This iBrief argues that, in the hypothetical network, the service 
providers have a valid termination policy.  Beyond that, however, the 
service providers do nothing to control network access.  Since the service 
providers do no more than enforce the termination policy, the service 
providers do not have the right and ability to control material on its 
network.  Therefore, the service providers should retain the safe harbor 
of section 512(c). 
G. Financial Benefit 
¶40 If a service provider does not have the right and ability to control 
infringing activity, the service provider can use the safe harbor of section 
512(c) regardless if the service provider obtains a financial benefit from 
the infringement.123  If a service provider has the right and ability to 
control activity or material on its network, however, the service provider 
can only use the section 512(c) safe harbor if the service provider does 
not “[derive] a direct financial benefit from the infringement.”124  In 
addition to obvious examples like subscription fees or paying for access 
to infringing materials, direct financial benefit includes what consists of 
a “draw” to a service provider.125  The Senate Report describes a draw as 
“any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to 
                                                            
121 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(“[T]he ‘right and ability to control’ the infringing activity, as the concept is 
used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to 
remove or block access to materials posted on its website or stored in its system.  
To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the DMCA and render the statute 
internally inconsistent.”). 
122 Id. at 1093–94. 
123 See Corbis, 351 F.Supp. at 1110 (“Because Amazon does not have the right 
and ability to control the infringing material, it is not necessary for this Court to 
inquire as to whether Amazon receives a direct financial benefit from the 
allegedly infringing conduct.”). 
124 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004). 
125 Id. at 1079 (“Thus, the central question of the ‘direct financial benefit’ 
inquiry in this case is whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for 
subscribers, not just an added benefit.”). 
 
 
infringing material.”126  In Ellison v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit held 
that America Online’s (AOL) USENET service did not retain subscribers 
or result in new subscribers.127  The court held that there was no direct 
financial benefit to the provider because the infringing activity did not 
add to AOL’s bottom line.128  Therefore, to retain safe harbor status, the 
infringing material or activity cannot be the reason users choose a certain 
service provider, if the service provider charges a subscription fee.  The 
Ninth Circuit has also held that, where the presence of material or 
activity increases users and thereby increases advertising revenue, the 
service provider derives a direct financial benefit from that material or 
activity.129  That holding, however, was in Napster, where the Ninth 
Circuit ruled under the broader standards of general secondary 
liability.130  Without any revenue or expected revenue, a service provider 
does not obtain any sort of financial benefit. 
¶41 If service providers were required to host files in order to 
download files, there would arguably be a benefit to the service 
providers.  The ability to download free copies of copyrighted materials 
may satisfy the financial benefit standard because there would otherwise 
be a cost to access that material.  The hypothetical network disassociates 
uploads from downloads and no benefits accrue to service providers.  As 
long as the service providers internalize the costs of running the network 
and receive no outside income in connection with running the network, 
the service providers would not obtain any financial benefit from 
infringing activity or material.  Since the service providers in the 
hypothetical network derive neither explicit financial benefit nor a 
privilege by storing material, the service providers derive no direct 
                                                            
126 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 45 (1998). 
127 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079 (“We note that there is no evidence that indicates 
that AOL customers either subscribed because of the available infringing 
material or canceled subscriptions because it was no longer available.”). 
128 Id. (“The record lacks evidence that AOL attracted or retained subscriptions 
because of the infringement or lost subscriptions because of AOL’s eventual 
obstruction of the infringement.  Accordingly, no jury could reasonably 
conclude that AOL received a direct financial benefit from providing access to 
the infringing material.”). 
129 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a 
‘draw’ for customers.’” (citing Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 
259, 263–64 (9th Cir. 1996))). 
130 Id. at 1024 (“Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material 
listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system. 
. . . Our review of the record requires us to accept the district court’s conclusion 
that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the 
vicarious copyright infringement claim.”). 
 
 
financial benefit from the infringing materials stored on the network.  
Therefore, the service providers may use the safe harbor of section 
512(c) because they do not derive a financial benefit from running the 
network. 
H. Notification 
¶42 Finally, section 512(c)(1) requires that service providers accept 
notifications from rights holders.131  These notifications inform service 
providers of infringing activity or material.132  If a rights holder does not 
present a notification prior to filing a suit for copyright infringement, a 
service provider is free to use the safe harbor at trial to disclaim 
liability.133  The section states that, “upon notification of claimed 
infringement as described in paragraph (3), [the service provider must 
respond] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that 
is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”134  
The referenced provision, section 512(c)(3), sets forth the notification 
requirements.135  There are several notification provisions, but for the 
purposes of the hypothetical network, the important notice requirement is 
section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).  Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that the 
notification include: “[i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be 
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”136  
Essentially, for a notification to be proper, a rights holder must identify 
infringing material and the location of that material.137 
¶43 The rights holder does not need to follow the strictures of the 
notification procedure; substantially compliant notification imparts 
knowledge to the service provider and creates liability for a service 
provider that does not acquiesce to the notification by removing 
infringing material.138  The statute requires identification of a specific 
                                                            
131 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2009). 
132 Id. 
133 Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (“Corbis, of course, was under no obligation to file notice of claimed 
infringement before filing this suit.”). 
134 § 512(c)(1)(C). 
135 § 512(c)(3). 
136 § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
137 Id. 
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 
F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“[Corbis’s] decision to forego the 
DMCA notice provisions, however, stripped it of the most powerful evidence of 
 
 
location of infringing material or activity,139 but there are at least two 
cases where specific identification is not required.  First, when virtually 
all of a network resource is infringing—such as a website—a rights 
holder need only identify that resource.140  In ALS Scan, the court held 
that the plaintiff had indeed provided sufficient information to locate 
infringing material by “assert[ing] that virtually all of the images at the 
two sites were its copyrighted material.”141  The court held that “when a 
letter provides notice equivalent to a list of representative works that can 
be easily identified by the service provider, the notice substantially 
complies with the notification requirements.”142   
¶44 Second, specific identification may not be required when the 
service provider can easily search for infringing material.143  In 
Hendrickson, the Central District of California held that a rights holder 
did not give eBay sufficient notice where the plaintiff only stated that 
pirated copies of his movie were being sold on eBay.144  Since he did not 
identify where the infringing material was located, the court ruled that 
the notification was insufficient.145  It noted that, however, like in ALS 
Scan, “there may be instances where a copyright holder need not provide 
eBay with specific item numbers to satisfy the identification 
requirement.”146  The court assumed that eBay could search for 
infringing material given enough information.147  The notification must 
                                                                                                                                     
a service provider’s knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the 
copyright holder.”). 
139 § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
140 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Comtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“ALS Scan . . . asserted that virtually all the images at the two sites were its 
copyrighted material . . . [and] ALS Scan substantially complied with the 
notification requirement.”).  
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[I]f 
a movie studio advised eBay that all listings offering to sell a new movie (e.g., 
``Planet X,'') that has not yet been released in VHS or DVD format are unlawful, 
eBay could easily search its website using the title ``Planet X'' and identify the 
offensive listings.”). 
144 Id. (“[Plaintiff] merely assert that pirated copies of ‘Manson’ DVDs were 
being sold on eBay . . . Plaintiff’s e-mail did not identify the basis for his claim 
that the seller was selling a pirated copy of ‘Manson.’”). 
145 Id. at 1092 (“[P]roper identification under Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) should 
include the specific item numbers of the listing that are allegedly offering 
pirated copies of “Manson” for sale.”). 
146 Id. at 1090. 
147 Id. at 1090 (“eBay could easily search its website using the title ‘Planet X’ 
and identify the offensive listings.”). 
 
 
denote, with some specificity, which files are infringing.  If a rights 
holder was unable to show that virtually all the data on the network is 
infringing (like in ALS Scan) or point to specific acts of infringement 
(like in Hendrickson), notification would be insufficient.   
¶45 In the hypothetical network, service providers only hold pieces 
of encrypted data.  Moreover, due to the encoding procedure, only users 
with an encoding key can translate the file pieces into the original 
encrypted file.  Note that if a dictatorial regime could easily scan for 
files, the utility of the network would be defeated.  Therefore, in the 
hypothetical network, infringing files can only be found by trusted users.  
Since only trusted users can find files, a rights holder would not have a 
way to determine the location of files that infringe its copyright.  
Furthermore, the file pieces are not recognizable unless combined to 
create a full file.  Thus, even if a rights holder did scan for and download 
file pieces, upon which there are no restrictions, the rights holder would 
be unable to determine if a certain file contained its copyrighted material.  
Therefore, the rights holder could not determine which copyrighted work 
the file infringed.  
¶46 Each service provider only holds one of part of a file; hence, it is 
impossible for a service provider to store an infringing file.  First, it is 
not possible for a rights holder to show what work is being infringed.  
When the data is encrypted and broken up, an individual part does not 
infringe on any work (at least to the extent that it does not accidentally 
transform the scrambled part into another copyrighted work).  Second, 
although a rights holder is allowed to search the network, the rights 
holder would have to be trusted with an encoding key to obtain the 
names of the file parts that constitute an original file.  In practice, a rights 
holder could not determine the location of infringing files.  Since the 
rights holder cannot determine which copyright a file infringes and the 
locations of files that infringe that work, the rights holder could not 
present a service provider with proper notification and, without proper 
notification, the service provider will never need to “expeditiously” 
remove infringing material as required in section (iii) of the knowledge 
provision.148 
IV. OTHER BODIES OF LAW 
¶47 This iBrief has argued that the service providers of the 
hypothetical network can tack gracefully into the safe harbor of section 
512(c).  Recent cases have indicated that potential service providers of 
the hypothetical network should consider the implication of liability 
based on bodies of law outside the safe harbor of section 512(c).  
                                                            
148 See supra Part III.E. 
 
 
¶48 Courts have held that certain providers exceeded the bounds of 
section 512 and were not privy to its safe harbor.149  In Aimster, for 
example, obvious infringement occurred and the service provider knew 
of the infringement.150 Aimster used the -ster ending for its network 
(echoing Napster), and affirmatively taught users how to infringe 
copyright on their network.151 In response, the Seventh Circuit spent little 
time dismissing the network operator’s ability to moor in the safe harbor 
of section 512.152  Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that networks 
may be liable for less obvious copyright infringement on a theory of 
inducement.153  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
the Court created this new theory of copyright liability.154  Grokster and 
StreamCast actively promoted infringement on their networks.155  The 
Court held that the companies were liable for the infringement of their 
users because “[t]he classic instance of inducement is by advertisement 
or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to 
commit violations.”156  The decision premised liability on affirmative 
acts: “Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive 
recipients of information about infringing use. . . .  Each took active steps 
to encourage infringement.”157  Moreover, the Court held that “mere 
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not 
                                                            
149 In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[In 
contrast with the intent of the DMCA,] Aimster invited [users to infringe 
copyright], showed them how they could do so with ease using its system, and 
by teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted 
material has disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement.”). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. V. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 
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be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.”158  Therefore, passive 
activity does not give rise to a claim of inducement.  
¶49 In the hypothetical network, the service providers do not 
advertise or provide any service to users, except storage.  The Grokster 
decision premised liability on affirmative acts.159  Therefore, the 
inducement liability created in Grokster is inapplicable to the 
hypothetical network’s service providers.  Moreover, the service 
providers in the hypothetical network have no idea what data is passing 
through their machines.  The service providers would not know that 
infringing activity was occurring on the network, in contrast with most 
file sharing systems.  Courts should not impose a new theory of liability 
because the hypothetical network respects both the letter and the overall 
spirit of section 512. 
CONCLUSION 
¶50 What if a service operated completely within the confines of 
section 512, yet allowed for unbridled copyright infringement?  This 
iBrief has outlined such a potential network.  Each service provider has a 
policy to terminate users and implements that policy, but is unlikely to 
enforce it.160  The service providers do not frustrate standard technical 
measures.161  The service providers provide storage at the direction of 
users.162  The service providers have neither knowledge nor reasonable 
possibility of knowledge of infringement.163  The service providers do 
not have a right or ability to control the users of the network,164 nor 
receive any financial benefit in connection with the network.165  There is 
a small likelihood a rights holder could serve a notice on a service 
provider that would give them knowledge of infringing activity or 
material on the network.166  A potential chink in this hypothetical is that 
a service provider in this potential network is a single user.  Although 
there is no statutory floor on the size of a service provider, a court may 
hold that Congress did not intend to allow the service provider definition 
to apply to individuals.167  Furthermore, a court may hold this 
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hypothetical network illegal because of the potential for unbridled 
infringement.   
¶51 This iBrief has argued that supporters of a hypothetical network 
will not be liable under secondary liability theories of copyright 
infringement.  The network assumes these supporters will retain pieces 
of files to ease information transfer among members of a group.  The 
network was designed to ensure unbridled transfer of information—for 
example, information that may otherwise be censored or monitored 
through normal communication channels of dictatorial governments.  
Therefore, the author hopes this hypothetical network will be used to 
encourage activities of oppressed minorities, specifically those seeking 
political communication.  Paradoxically, even if these supporters hold 
files that infringe copyright, the supporters may still benefit from the 
broad safe harbor within section 512 of the DMCA. 
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